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action. 86 Loyalty and patriotism are sometimes as important qualifications for a teacher as knowledge, and it is within the province
of the legislative branch to prescribe what evidence of qualification
shall be furnished.37 In American Communications Assn., C.I.O. v.
Douds the Court stated ".

.

. they are subject to possible loss of

position only because there is substantial ground for the congressional
judgment that their beliefs and loyalties will be transformed into
future conduct." 38 In a leading New York case it was held that
"The presumption growing out of a prima facie case, however, remains
only so long as there is no substantial evidence to the contrary. When
that is offered the presumption disappears, and unless met by further proof there is nothing to justify a finding based solely upon
it." ss In the light of these authorities and the fact that there is
provision in the law 40 for judicial review of any order of ineligibility
for a teaching position, it cannot be said that there is any lack of
41
procedural due process in the directive clauses of the law in question.
The novelty of the Feinberg Law may not be used as a basis
of constitutional objection. 42 In view of the legislative determination
of facts and circumstances constituting a menace to society, and the
nature and language of the provisions of the Feinberg Law, it is
submitted that the conclusion reached by the court is in accord with
the weight of authority and is a reassertion of the state's right to use
the police power to protect itself from internal threat.

)X
CRIMINAL LAW-INSANITY DURING PROCEEDINGs-GRouNDS

FOR NEW TRIAL.-A defendant was convicted of murder in the first
degree. There was nothing in his demeanor during trial to suggest
to the court or to any layman that he was incapable of understanding
the proceedings or making a rational defense. When the verdict
of guilty was announced the defendant harangued the court claiming to be the "messiah". Upon motion, he was taken to a hospital
for observation, and adjudged as presently insane. Defendant was
then removed to a state institution for the criminal insane. Five
years later, having regained his sanity,' he was sentenced to death.
The following day, a motion was made for a new trial on the ground
3
6
37

American Communications Assn., C-I.O. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382 (1950).
Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189 (1898).

38American

Communications Assn., C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 413

(1950).
39
4

Potts v. Pardee, 220 N. Y. 431, 433, 116 N. E. 78, 79 (1917).
0 N. Y. Civi. SERvicE LAW § 12-a, subd. d.

41 N. Y. EDucATioN LAW § 3022.
42 People of New York v. Nebbia, 262 N. Y. 259, 186 N. E. 694 (1933).
1 People v. Wolfe, 198 Misc. 695 (County Ct 1950).
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that the defendant was insane during the trial in 1944. This allegation was based upon the testimony of psychiatrists as to the nature
of his illness after trial. Held, motion granted. It is for the court
to determine whether the defendant is in such a state of insanity so
as to be incapable of understanding the proceeding or making a
rational defense. The court is governed by the legal test and not
medical standards of insanity. People v. Wolfe, 102 N. Y. S. 2d 12
(County Ct. 1950).
Among the ancient Hebrews, the present insanity of an accused
was recognized as a bar to criminal prosecution. The marked divergence of an individual's manifestations from ordinary behavior
patterns would immunize him from trial per se.2 Less radical indications of mental abnormality would preclude prosecution in the
discretion of the presiding judge.3
The early common law did not relieve a person presently insane
from prosecution. The defendant was convicted and the court bid
him to hope for the king's mercy. 4 The court did not distinguish the
mental capacity of the defendant required for trial and that upon
which his answerability for criminal conduct is predicated. 5
Later the common law established the principle that a person
while in a state of mental disorder, so as to be incapable of making
a rational defense could not be tried, sentenced, nor punishment
executed. Thus, if the court had a reasonable doubt as to the mental
competency of the defendant at any time, the proceedings were stayed
and an inquiry held. If the defendant was declared insane, the proceedings were suspended6 and the defendant suitably confined until
restoration of his sanity.
2

TALmUp, HAGIGAH, 3B, 4A. "Who is abnormal-he who walks around
at night by himself or sleeps on the cemetery or one who tears his garments
or one who destroys all that is given to him."; MAIMONimES, LAWS OF TESTIMONY, C. 9, § 9. "Not only one who walks naked, breaks or throws stones but
also one whose words are unbalanced or incoherent, even though he sometimes
answers coherently."
3 MAIMONIDES, LAWS OF TEsIMoNY, c. 9, § 10. "Who are especially the
fools, are those who are not aware of what they are talking and contradict
themselves and do not understand the problem involved as ordinary persons.
They are nervous and hasty in their minds showing signs of abnormality. The
judge must decide whether he is insane or not."
42 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 479 (2d ed. 1899).
5
See WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW 18, n. 15
(1933), for mention of an early legal test of insanity "'That if he bee able
to
begeat
eyther soone or daughter, hee is no foole.' Kings Prerog.
(1567)
z . ... ,
61If aman, in his sound memory commits a capital offense, and before
arraignment for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it; because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought.
And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried:
for how can he make his defense? If, after he be tried and found guilty, he
loses his senses before judgment, judgment shall not be pronounced; and if,
after judgment, he becomes of nonsane memory, execution shall be stayed."
4 BL. Comm. *24; Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937 (6th Cir. 1899);
Freeman v. People, 4 Denio 2 (N. Y. 1847).
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The test as it finally evolved, in the determination of whether a
defendant's mental condition permitted prosecution on criminal
charges, may generally be stated: "Has the defendant capacity to
understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to
comprehend his own condition in reference to such proceedings, and
to aid his attorney rationally in the preparation and prosecution of
his defense?" 7

The common law bar to prosecution and punishment of a mentally ill person and the test for the determination of his mental condition has been codified by statute.8 The court, in its discretion,9
at any time before final judgment,'0 may order an examination" 1
to determine the question of the defendant's sanity, where there are
reasonable doubts 12 as to the defendant's mental competency.18 This
may be ordered on the court's motion, or that of the district attorney, or of the defendant. If a defendant under sentence of death
appears insane, the Governor may order a mental examination and
upon an affirmative finding, commit
the defendant to a state hos4
pital until his sanity is regained.'
It may be stated generally that no court had inherent power
to grant a new trial under common law and such power could only
7 Pollak, Insanity as a Bar to Prosecution in the Federal Courts, 7 FED.

B. J. 55, 56 (1945); United States v. Chisolm, 149 Fed. 284 (C. C. S. D.
Ala. 1906).
8N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1120; N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 481, 495a, 498,
499, 658-662f, 870-876; see People v. Pershaec, 172 Misc. 324, 15 N. Y. S. 2d
215 (Gen. Sess. 1939), wherein the court interprets statutes pertaining to insane persons exhaustively.
9 People v. McElvaine, 125 N. Y. 596, 26 N. E. 929, affd sub ntn.,
McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U. S. 155 (1891) ; People ex rel. Pickell v. Onondaga

County Court, 190 Misc. 466, 73 N. Y. S. 2d 917 (Sup. Ct 1947).
'ON. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 658.

11 N. Y. CODE CraM. PRoc. §§ 659, 662, 662a, 662b. Two qualified psychiatrists examine the defendant to determine whether he is capable of understanding the proceedings or of making a defense. Their findings may be
controverted by the district attorney or the defendant. The examination is an
aid to the court which must make the final determination.
12 People v. Esposito 287 N Y 389 39 N. E. 2d 925 (1942); People v.
Tobin, 176 N. Y. 278, 8 N.'E. 359 (1903); People ex rel. Apicella v. Sup't
of Kings County Hospital, 173 Misc. 642, 18 N. Y. S 2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
13 People ex rel. Vallaro v. Travis, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 804 (Sup. Ct 1947);
People v. Irwin, 166 Misc. 751, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 548 (Gen. Sess. 1938); People.
v. Nyhan, 37 N. Y. Cr. R. 74, 171 N. Y. Supp. 466 (Sup. Ct. 1918). The
court must apply the "legal test" as distinguished from a "medical test"
14 N. Y. Comn CRiM. PRoc. §§ 495a, 499. The Governor may appoint a commission to examine the defendant's mental state. If the defendant is insane
as determined by the "legal test", the Governor may order his removal to a
state hospital for the criminal insane until the defendant's sanity is regained.
A supreme court justice must determine when the defendant is presently sane.
The Governor, upon receipt of a certificate from the supreme court justice
that the defendant is sane, must then issue a warrant for a new time of
execution; 2 Op. Arry. GEN. 294 (1914). The inquiry to be made by the
justice of the supreme court is an informal investigation controlled in its extent
entirely by what the justice deems adequate and essential.
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be conferred by statute. 5 Courts do, however, possess certain inherent prerogatives among which are the right to correct their records so as to make them speak the truth, and to prevent oppression
and the abuse of authority.16
In the instant case, the defendant moved in part for a new trial,
on the ground that upon another trial, the defendant could produce
evidence, which if it had been received, would probably have changed
the verdict.17 It was intended to prove at the new trial that the
defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime.
The district attorney opposed the motion on the grounds that the
defendant is not permitted to have separate trials of his several defenses, and the law permits a defense of insanity to the responsilility
for the commission of a crime, if the defendant was laboring under
such defect of reason as not to know the nature and quality of the
act; or, that it was wrong, which is concluded by the trial, whether
it is interposed or not.
The court was of the opinion that a reading of the moving
papers and oral arguments advanced at the hearing for the motion,
clearly indicated that "....

the defendant's more articulate contention

is that the court was without authority to permit the trial to commence." 1 8 The court, acknowledging that its authority is delimited
by Section 1120 of the Penal Law, rested its determination of the
application on a sound interpretation of that statute which was first
enunciated in Freeman v. People19 where the court said, "The statute
...is emphatic that 'no insane person can be tried.' The common
law, equally with this statute, forbids the trial of any person in a
state of insanity."
It is to be noted that the instant case, one of first impression
but soundly decided, places the obligation for the determination of
the defendant's mental competency upon the court,20 whether or
not a motion is made to hold an inquiry and whether or not his
demeanor during trial raises doubts as to his sanity according to
legal standards. 21 The burden of justice is great, to distinguish the
mentally ill from one feigning madness.
15 Quimbo Appo v. People, 20 N. Y. 531 (1860) ; People v. Lamboray, 152
Misc. 206, 273 N. Y. Supp. 69 (Sp. Sess. 1934); People v. Becker, 91 Misc.

329, 155 N. Y. Supp. 107 (Sup. Ct. 1915).

"IPeople v Gersewitz, 294 N. Y. 163, 61 N. E. 2d 427 (1945) ; People
exr rel. Hirschberg v. Orange County Court, 271 N. Y. 151, 2 N. E. 2d 521
(1936) ; People v. Glen, 173 N. Y. 395, 66 N. E. 112 (1903) ; Sanders v.
State, 85 Ind. 318 (1882). The mere fact that pardon power exists in the
governor does not mean that the courts cannot grant a new trial.
27N. Y. CoDm CPim. PRGoc. § 465.
18 People v. Wolfe, 102 N. Y. S. 2d 12 (County Ct. 1950).
10 4 Denio 2, 24 (N. Y. 1847).
20 145 A. M. A. J. No. 1, p. 37 (1950).
21 "That cannot be a fact in law, which is not a fact in science; that cannot
be health in law, which is disease in fact." Doe, J., in Boardman v. Woodman,
47 N. H. 120, 150 (1866).
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It is submitted that the problem raised in the instant case is
more satisfactorily answered, in accordance with advanced social
concepts, by the "Briggs Law" 22 in Massachusetts. By statute, a
routine mental examination is made of all persons indicted by a
grand jury for a capital offense, and persons who have been conbeen previously indicted for
victed of a felony or are known to 2have
3
any other offense more than once.

X
CRIMINAL

LAW-MATERIAL

WITNESS-AMOUNT

HOLDING AS A WITNESS A PERSON

OF BAIL-

CHARGED WITH A CRIME.--

Application for writ of habeas corpus. Relator was a material witness for the People in a grand jury investigation of gambling and
corruption in Kings County. The County Court directed him to
furnish a 250,000 dollar bond and upon his failure to do so he was
committed to jail. Thereafter, on the basis of the above-mentioned
grand jury investigation an information was filed charging relator
with conspiracy and bookmaking. A plea of not guilty was entered
and relator was paroled in his own custody in view of his detention
in the grand jury investigation. Relator contends that inasmuch
as he is now a defendant named in the information, the order detaining him as a witness should be vacated and he should be released.
Held, writ dismissed. An order requiring bail in a high amount may
be justified by the facts of the particular situation. The fact that
an information has been filed in which a person is charged with crimes
does not preclude his being held as a witness in an investigation
embracing matters other than the crimes charged in the information.
People ex rel. Gross v. Sheriff of City of New York, 277 App. Div.
546, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 271 (2d Dep't 1950).
Section 618-b of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
a witness for the People may be ordered to enter into an undertaking
to insure appearance or be committed for failure to comply.1 This
section of the Code was enacted to guarantee attendance of key witnesses at a criminal trial or a grand jury investigation. 2 The req22
See WEHoFEN, INSANITY AS A DFFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW 351, 401407 (1933).
23 MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 123, § 100A (1949).
I Section 618-b provides: "Whenever a judge of a court of record in
this state is satisfied, by proof on oath, that a person residing or being in this
state is a necessary and material witness for the People in a criminal action
or proceeding... he may, after an opportunity has been given to such person
to ...be heard in opposition thereto, order such person to enter into a written
undertaking . . . and upon his neglect or refusal to comply . . .the judge
must commit him...
2 People ex rel. Ditchik v. Sheriff of Kings County, 171 Misc. 248, 12
N. Y. S.2d 341 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 256 App. Div. 1081, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 232
(2d Dep't 1939).

